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Inflation and Wage Dispersion
ABSTCT
Alarge body of empiricalworkhas derriorfstrated that higherinflation,
especially when it is unexpected, leads to greater dispers.ior in the
distribution of price changes across subaggregates, A sparse and more recent
literature suggests exactly the opposite effects on the distribution ofwage
changes. This study firstreconcilesthese apparently opposite results usinc
a model in which shocks to the econom> can affect both wages and prices and
the demand for indexing. If the positive effect of shocks on the demand for
indexing is sufficiently large, the dispersion of changes in wages or prices
will be reduced even though the shocks' direct effect is to incr-ease this
dispersion. Impl icitly from the evidence, this offset is large enough in
wage—setting, but not so large in price determination.
Additional evidence on the relationship between inflation and the
dispersion of wage changes is provided by empirical i.iork for 14 israeli
manufacturing industries, 156—82. The results suggest that in Israel, Just as
in the United States (on which previous work has been conducted) with its much
less rapid and variable inflation, dispersion also decreased with unexpected
price inflation.
AllanDrazen DanielS.Hairerrresh
rpartrrentof Economics Dapartirent of Economics TelAvivUniversity MichiganStateUniversity
Ramat-aviv,ISIEL East Lansina, Mt48824I. Introduction
The relation between inflation and relative price variability has
received increasing attention in recent years. Several authors have found
that increased relative price variability is associated with increases in
unanticipated inflation (Parks, 1978; Fischer, 1982; Cukierman and Wachtel,
1982, to name a few). The apparent pervasiveness of this phenomenon across
countries (see, for example, Cukierman and Leiderman, 1981, for discussion of
the Israeli experience) has led to a wide acceptance of the view that this
positive correlation is (to use Friedman's terminology) an empirical
1 "regularity" of economic systems.
Hamermesh (1986) has considered the relation between unexpected
inflation and relative wage variability in the United States and found that
the "regularity" does not hold. Increases in unexpected inflation tended to
narrow the dispersion of wage changes across sectors in the period 1955—81.
Allen (1984) finds similar results for the postwar U.S., but finds that
unexpected inflation widened the dispersion of relative wage changes in the
United States before World War II.
These results raise at least two questions. First, is the narrowing of
wage dispersion in response to inflation unique to the postwar United States,
or is it characteristic of other economies as well, particularly those with
much higher and more variable rates of price inflation? Second, if lowerwage
variability is a general result, how might it be consistent with the above




Webegin by setting out a prototype model that can account for both a
positive and a negative relation between inflation and price dispersion,
depending on the nature of the price—setting process. The key question is
whether prices are set before or after an aggregate nominal shock Is
observed. If price and quantity decisions must be made before the realization
of the inflation shock is known, increased unanticipated inflation will
increase relative price dispersion in a model where there is a confusion of
aggregate and relative shocks. If, however, indexing arrangements allow
prices to be adjusted after nominal shocks have been observed, a higher mean
level of unanticipated inflation (that is, greater inflation uncertainty) may
increase the degree of indexing and reduce price dispersion. In short, the
effect of inflation on the dispersion of wage or price changes depends on the
nature of price—setting——whether prices are set ex ante or ex post the
realization of aggregate nominal shocks——and how inflation changes the nature
of price—setting arrangements.






d s where y(i) are the logarithms of quantity demanded and supplied of
good i, is log price of good i, p(i) is the perception by individuals
in market I of the general price level, x is an aggregate nominal variable3
(so that the second right—hand side term in (1) can be thought of as a real—
balance effect), and w(i) is a random (excess) demand shock.
—p(i)is the locally perceived relative price, so
that ii(i) and y(i) are demand and supply elasticities (u, '>0) ,whichcan
vary across markets. This characteristic is crucial to the results.
The excess demand shock is assumed normal with mean zero and
variance cy2, and w(i) is uncorrelated over time and across markets. The rate
of change of the nominal variable x. Ax E x —x -obeys: t,t t t—1'
-,
(3)Ax =E (Ax)+
t t—1 t t =+ , t t
so that is that part of Ax which is predictable given information up to
and including t—1 and is assumed known to individuals in all markets. The
innovation is assumed normal with mean zero and variance a,serially
uncorrelated and independent of w(i) .Onemay note that will in
general convey information about c and, since relative demand shocks differ
across markets, how the posterior expectation of x varies across markets,
leading to differential expectations about the current general price
level p(i) .Asa reference point we may then solve for the market—clearing
price:
cA1[x1 + + El—aX]p*(i)+ +
where X = .Thisgeneral set—up is almost identical to that used ii.i(i) +y(i)
in Cukierman and Leiderman (1984).
We model price—setting and indexing as follows. In each period the4
market—clearing price is observed, and the market—clearing quantity is
transacted. Agents may decide that the price actually paid may be adjusted ex




= + + ''—x1p(1)+ + + "' ,
where3(i) is an indexing parameter in the i'th market.
In the case where no indexing is used, p(i) = .Inthe other polar
case, where sector—specific demand shocks are not allowed to influence prices,
(5) becomes:
= + + [1 —aX](i)+
where the first two terms in (5') are known at time t.
We can now compute the dispersion of equilibrium relative prices under
different assumptions about the weights given to sector—specific demand shocks
and ex—post indexing in setting individual prices. For simplicity, assume
that the degree of indexing is the same across sectors, so that
i) =3for all 1.






whereu(i) is the weight of the i'th good. Pt is a function of the
which in turn depend on the expectation of p, namely p(i).In
equilibrium p, and p(i) are determined simultaneously. To find the
solution, we use the method of undetermined coefficients. Since the model is
log—linear, we hypothesize a solution:
Pt =it+ •ff2Xt_i+
r3Et
where the it1areto be determined.




where I(i)is the information set in market iatt,which includes
(Remember we are assuming that the market—clearing price is known, even if it
is not the transaction price). Since all other aggregate information (which
is the same across markets) is independent of ,itis information on Pt(i)
that is crucial In taking the expectation of From (4), an observation on
pt(i) is equivalent to an observation on aE(i) + w(i). Given the normality
of and io(i) ,theoptimal linear forecast is the least—squares projection
of c on [c + w(i)], yielding:
(9) E(ctIIt(i)) =-[ct+ u(i)], where 0 +
Wethus obtain:6
(10) p(i) = +¶2Xti+¶3 [act +u(i)]
and
11
= +x1]+[1— +¶2Xti + ¶3 +
+ Xi[czc + w(i)]+










Substituting into the expression for p(i) and rearranging terms:
X1(1 -eEl+131)+ + aa]
(13) p(i) = +x1+
1— + [act
+w(i)]+13ct
Finally, we can compute Pt in equilibrium by substituting (13) into (6) and
recognizing that the sum of terms in w.(i) converges (in probability) to zero:
aa+ 13 (4)Pt t+ tl+
—0 +a0ar
Wecan now compute relative price variability as a function of
unanticipated nominal shocks for a given degree of indexing. One measure of
relative price variability is:7
(15) S EEu(i)[;(i) — wi
Using (13) and (14) in (15) yields:
S =2(1—O[1+ 81)2 DH(X)c
(16)
+ (JO—8[1+ ))+[+ + (1 -GEl+
where H(X) =Yu(i)(X. )2 and U =[1—0
i
1
Equation (16) summarizes the determinants of relative price variability. The
second term shows that relative price variability depends, naturally, on the
varability of relative excess demand shocks. The first term shows that it
depends on the level of the unanticipated nominal shock (an effect discussed
by Hercowitz, 1981; 1982), with the size of the effect determined by the
extent of indexing. Given i3,ahigher mean c2 induces higher price
dispersion.
How will dispersion be related to 8 for a given realization of ?
One immediately notices that for —1,increasesin 8 will decrease the
effect of given nominal shocks on dispersion. For increased aggregate nominal
uncertainty (as measured by higher mean 2) to decrease relative price
dispersion, it must therefore increase the indexing parameter 8 .Thatis,
for a given 8 higher clearly increases dispersion. If, however,
higher r2 induces an increase in the degree of indexing 8 ,dispersioncan
fall.
The source of an increase in B is not hard to find. If we consider the
variance of a single relative price, we see that it too is related to B
Calling this variance S, we have:8
2 (20) S1 =EE —
= a2(i—eEl+ 8])2[X.—aJ2•i2+ x{(i—e[l+8])+[8+ Da2
Aslong as is sufficiently small, an increase in 8 (for 8 —1)will
decrease Si, while an increase in a will increase S1. Therefore, If
individual utility is a decreasing function of the price variability of one
2 price,an optimal response to an increase In a is a higher degree of
indexing.
This model can obviously be extended in a number of ways. Differential
indexing would increase relative price (or wage) dispersion. More complicated
indexing schemes (such as an explicit relation of the degree of indexing to
observed economic variables) would enrich this model. Our purpose here was to
present a model in which the effects of different methods of price—setting
could be studied and the possibility of their different effects on the
dispersion of relative prices and wages be explored.
III. Testing the Dispersion Hypothesis
The theoretical model suggests that, where indexing is a possibility,
Increases in unanticipated inflation may actually lower dispersion by
increasing the degree of (implicit or explicit) indexing. As an evaluation of
the applicability of these ideas, annual data from the Israeli economy were
used to examine the model describing the variability of relative wage changes
between 1956 and 1982. Data covering 14 manufacturing and mining industries,
accounting for approximately 90 percent of output in these sectors, were
3'
used.—,Withits rapid and highly variable inflation, Israel may be a good9
example of an economy in which wage—setting is characterized by changes in the
degree of formal, and especially informal indexing as uncertainty about
inflation varies.
Using the same equation for calculating the variance of relative wage
changes as in Haniermesh (1986), we computed Var (w) as the weighted average of
4 annual changes in the relative nominal daily wage rates of workers. —The
same formula was used to calculate the variance of changes in relative output,
Var(y), with output being measured by the index of industrial production for
each industry.
The annual inflation rate, p, was calculated as the twelve—month
average of annualized monthly rates of change in the Consumer Price Index in
Israel. Unlike the TJnited States, in which several surveys on expectations
about price inflation exist (and are used in Hamermesh, 1986), no comparable
series exist in Israel. To test the model we thus construct inflation
forecasts based on macro time series. The first forecast uses monthly rates
of inflation to construct ARIt'IA forecasts for one, two, three, etc., up to
twelve months ahead. In each case the most recent seven years of data on
prices were used. Thus, for example, data on monthly inflation rates from
1948—1954 were used to construct an ARIMA forecast of the monthly inflation
rates in 1955. while different ARIMA structures characterized different
seven—year time periods in Israeli inflation in the past 35 years, in most
cases integrated autoregressive processes involving one— and twelve—month lags
had the greatest explanatory power. Thus the series pe was constructed using
these forecasts. Unexpected inflation using this forecast is p —
Thesecond forecast of inflation is the naive projection of the
previous year's rate of price inflation, p_1. Such a simple forecast may
prove adequate in an economy such as Israel's, in which inflation until the10
1980's hasseemedto fluctuate randomly on several plateaus between which
there are discrete jumps. Unexpected inflation based on this forecast is p —
p_i.
The basic data (other than Var y) are shown in Table 1. It is apparent
that, as in the United States, there is no particular trend in Var w. The
series does show substantial variability, but some of the lowest values are
observed in the early 1980s, the years of most rapid inflation in Israeli
history. The forecasts p track the broad trends in inflation fairly well,
but seem to predict poorly the yearly variation in inflation rates in the
early part of the sample period. This is undoubtedly the result of the rapid
annual fluctuations in inflation in the early 1950s and the lack of a
significant trend term In the forecasting equations in that period.
The estimates of the determinants of Var w are presented in Table 2.
Theequations were estimated using the Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment for serial
correlation in the errors. As in Hamermesh's (1986) results for the United
States, increases in the dispersion of output shocks increase the dispersion
of wage changes. As the estimates In the first column show, though, there is
essentially no relation between Var w and the actual rate of price
inflation. In both the United States and Israel, and contrary to the received
wisdom about the effects of price inflation on the dispersion of relative
prices, the data do not Indicate any relation between inflation and relative
wage dispersion.
As In the United States, however, once the series on price inflation is
decomposed into expected and unexpected components we observe a striking
relationshipbetween inflation and Var w. Neither of the two inflation
forecasts,p_1 orpC,hasa significant effect on the dispersion of relative
wagechanges. However, In both cases, and especially for the naive forecast,Table 1. Variance of Annual Relative Wage Changes,
Inflation Rate and ARIMA Forecast of Inflation,
Israel, 1956—82
Year Variancea
1956 .0860 4.059 17.19
1957 .0183 5.423 0.131
1958 .0537 4.363 —7.144
1959 .0512 2.334 —10.53
1960 .0519 3.560 1.228
1961 .0714 9.477 3.309
1962 .0374 10.28 7.670
1963 .0447 5.102 9.480
1964 .0207 4.582 7.246
1965 .0415 7.137 6.713
1966 .0162 7.861 8.274
1967 .0929 0.205 7.572
1968 .0818 1.959 .457
1969 .1033 3.925 0.842
1970 1.0726 10.22 3.317
1971 .0895 13.44 9.698
1972 .0950 12.42 13.77
1973 .1667 26.49 15.43
1974 .0690 26.49 31.92
1975 .0620 23.71 75.54
1976 .0951 38.24 39.62
1977 .5578 43.21 46.61
1978 .4611 48.34 48.90
1979 .2072 111.9 54.85
1980 .0981 112.7 107.7
1981 .0662 102.0 146.1
1982 .0563 131.8 147.7
aActual variables x io2.Table 2. Determinants of Var w, 14 Manufacturing Industries,
Israel, 1956_82a













Var y .079 .106 .090
(4.91) (6.86) (5.47)
.47 .60 .51
p .16 .46 .27
(.73) (2.21) (1.22)
at_statistics in parentheses.11
p_1, unexpected inflation, the deviation of the actual inflation rate from the
forecast, has a negative effect on the dispersion of relative wage changes.
The term representing unexpected inflation is highly significant in the
equation using p_1, and is significantly different from zero at the 90—percent
5
level in the equation using e —
Whetherthe very strong results using the forecast are more
believable than those using the ARIIIA forecast, e,dependspartly on which
forecast predicts annual inflation rates better. Some evidence on this
question is presented in Table 3, showing regressions of the inflation rate on
these forecasts. As the Table makes clear, the R2 is higher for the naive
forecast than for the annualized monthly ARIMA forecast; and the latter does
not add to the explanatory power of the lagged forecast when both are included
in the same regression. We may conclude from this that the results based on
6 the naive forecast deserve greater attention. —
IV.Conclusions
In this note we have shown how relative prices and wages are affected
by shocks to relative demand and to the entire economy. We have demonstrated
that their effects depend on whether they also affect the extent of indexing
of price— and/or wage—setting. In particular, if greater absolute shocks to
the economy increase the demand for indexation, those shocks can reduce
dispersion in wage— and/or price—setting. Without any change in indexation,
though, larger shocks will increase dispersion.
Earlier empirical work has shown that inflationary shocks have
increased the dispersion of relative price changes in the postwar United
States, while decreasing the dispersion of relative wage changes. Similarly,
other work hasdemonstratedthat (the much larger) inflationary shocks haveTable 3. Forecasts of Annual Inflation Rate,
Israel, 1956—82
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increased the dispersion of relative price changes in Israel. Our empirical
work shows that, as in the United States, those shocks reduce the dispersion
of relative wage changes in Israel. Taken as a whole and in conjunction with
the model set forth here, the results indicate that inflationary shocks induce
workers to seek (formal and informal) indexing to such an extent that
relative—wage variability declines in response to the shock. While shocks may
induce some increase in the indexing of price—setting arrangements, it is
implicitly less extensive, as it is insufficient to offset the positive
effects of the shocks on the observed dispersion in relative prices. The
difference between wage— and price—setting in an environment of inflationary
shocks may perhaps be due to the greater risk aversion of individuals in their
roles as workers than as consumers.13
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FOOTNOTES
1/One should note the finding of Hercowitz (1982). He argued that both
relative price dispersion and unanticipated inflation may be thought of as
endogenous, being driven by, among other things, monetary shocks. He found no
significant correlation between unanticipated money shocks and relative price








+Yu(1)(X1 +2-[1 —aX1] ¶3wt(i) a
+lB + aYu(i)[X1 +2. —aXj]ir3J)s I
Itsright—hand side equals that of (7), so that the coefficients must be equal. To
obtain (12) we use the fact that, with a large number of small" markets, the third
term on the right side converges to zero in probability (whenXi is bounded away
from zero).
3''Theprinting and publishing, diamond, basic metal, and miscellaneous
manufacturing industries were excluded. For the former three data were not
available for the entire period, while we felt that miscellaneous manufacturing was
so heterogeneous that its composition would change frequently and thus induce errors
into our estimates.
4,
'Theweights were the shares of industrial production accounted for by each
industry. For 1955—1960 the 1955 weights were used; for 1961—1969 weights from 1963
were used; for 1970—1978 weights from 1970 were used, while 1979 weights were
applied to the data from 1979—1982.
5'—,Itis also worth noting that the Box—Pierce test cannot reject the
hypothesis that the residuals from this simple bivariate regression of p on
p_1 are white noise. Using the contemporaneous correlatlon2and three lags,
anamaking Haugh's correction for degrees of freedom, the x test—statistic is
8.39. While this is significantly different from zero at the 90—percent level, it
is not so at the 95—percent level.